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CASE NOTES
manifest injustice.48 So long as the criminal defendant is afforded due
process and steps are taken to avoid the conviction of an innocent per-
son, the court appears to be satisfied. Convictions based on guilty pleas
will be upheld in Minnesota, provided the standards for accepting the
pleas are applied properly, within the limits established by the United
States Supreme Court in Alford.
Evidence-Remedies-Property Rights-Torts-Busch v. Busch
Construction, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
In this 1977 decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the
doctrine of curative admissibility, discussed remittiturs and the rea-
sonableness of jury verdicts, expanded the right of women to bring
actions for future medical expenses, and adopted a comparative fault
analysis in strict products liability suits.
In Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc.,I the Minnesota Supreme Court
addressed a number of significant issues that affect the law of evidence,2
damages,' married women's property rights,' and products liability.'
Busch involved six consolidated personal injury actions arising out of a
single vehicle accident. The accident victims contended that a plastic
particle broke loose from the turn signal switch prior to the accident,
causing the steering wheel to lock and the vehicle to go out of control.'
General Motors, manufacturer of the automobile, disputed the plain-
tiffs' theory of causation, maintaining that the accident resulted from
the driver falling asleep at the wheel or his inattention.' After a twelve
week trial, the jury found Lando Busch, the vehicle's driver, fifteen
percent at fault, and General Motors, on a strict liability theory, eighty-
five percent at fault.'
would have adverse effect on use of plea negotiations as an aid to effective administration
of justice); Note, supra note 36, at 123.
48. See, e.g., Coolen v. State, 288 Minn. 44, 48, 179 N.W.2d 81, 84 (1970) ("[An
application to withdraw a plea of guilty ... should be granted whenever necessary to
correct a manifest injustice."); Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 20-21, 162 N.W.2d 698,
703 (1968) ("We have refused to order vacation of a guilty plea when manifest injustice
has not been demonstrated."); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GutLTY § 2.1(b), Commentary § 2.1(b) (Approved
Draft 1968).
1. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
2. See notes 9-32 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 33-44 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 45-65 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 66-100 infra and accompanying text.
6. 262 N.W.2d at 383-84.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 383.
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In affirming the verdict, the supreme court initially examined the
doctrine of curative admissibility.' Essentially, this doctrine permits
otherwise inadmissible evidence to be introduced when a party's oppo-
nent previously introduced similar inadmissible evidence. 0 An exami-
nation of this doctrine was necessitated when General Motors claimed
that on seven occasions the claimants introduced improper evidence,
mandating the acceptance of its own otherwise inadmissible evidence."
Because of the variety of circumstances in which the doctrine of cura-
tive admissibility has arisen, courts are in disagreement as to its proper
application.'2 The major area of disagreement is whether making an
9. See id. at 386. Previous Minnesota cases have recognized the doctrine but the term
"curative admissibility" has never been used in any prior decisions. See id. at 387. For
prior Minnesota cases applying the curative admissibility doctrine without referring to it
by name, see McNab v. Jeppesen, 258 Minn. 15, 102 N.W.2d 709 (1960) (automobile
collision; on cross-examination of patrolman, defendant, without objection, elicited that
impact occurred on west portion of pavement; testimony of engineer, thereafter called by
plaintiff, as to lane of collision held admissible); Albertson v. Chicago, M., St. P. &
P.R.R., 242 Minn. 50, 64 N.W.2d 175 (1954) (personal injury suit; plaintiffs witness
testified, over objection, to certain requests made by employees upon defendant; later
testimony of defendant's witness denying such request held admissible).
10. 262 N.W.2d at 386. See generally C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK O THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 57 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); 1 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 15 (3d ed. 1940).
11. General Motors claimed that it was reversible error to disallow its expert witness
to testify in rebuttal to testimony offered by Kathleen Vohnoutka that Lando Busch was
"trying to turn the steering wheel" prior to the accident. 262 N.W.2d at 387-88. The court
held that application of the doctrine of curative admissibility was not proper because
plaintiff's testimony was admissible. See id. at 388. Six additional reversible errors were
claimed by General Motors. First, General Motors claimed that it was impermissible for
Lando Busch to testify that he did not fall asleep at the wheel because "he never fell
asleep." See id. In this instance, the doctrine of curative admissibility was not proper
because General Motors' proper rebuttal should have been direct or circumstantial evi-
dence that Busch fell asleep at the wheel. See id. Second, it was claimed that the testi-
mony offered by plaintiff's expert witness as to causation was improper. See id. The Busch
court determined that this argument was unmeritorious because the testimony on causa-
tion was admissible. See id. at 389. Third, General Motors claimed that improper testi-
mony was offered by plaintiff's expert witness as to reaction time of a person under
distress. See id. In this instance, the doctrine of curative admissibility was inapplicable
because General Motors prejudiced itself by misconstruing the trial court's order, which
would have allowed rebuttal testimony. See id. Fourth, General Motors argued that testi-
mony offered as to the restful night Lando Busch spent prior to the accident was improper.
See id. Because this testimony was admissible, the doctrine of curative admissibility did
not apply. See id. at 390. Fifth, testimony of the investigating officers concerning alcohol
consumption was claimed to be inadmissible. See id. Because this testimony was also
admissible, the doctrine of curative admissibility did not apply. See id. Finally, testimony
concerning Busch's driving and sleeping habits was challenged. See id. As with the two
preceding allegations of error, because the testimony was admissible, the doctrine of
curative admissibility did not apply. See id.
12. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 58, at 132 ("Because of the many variable
factors affecting the solution in particular cases the decisions do not lend themselves easily
to generalizations.").
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objection to the original inadmissible evidence is a prerequisite to the
admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence under the doctrine. 3 The
Busch court had to determine whether objection to the original inadmis-
sible evidence was necessary because General Motors twice failed to
object to the introduction of evidence it subsequently claimed as the
basis for introducing its own otherwise inadmissible evidence."
Three rules have been formulated to determine whether an objection
to the original inadmissible evidence is necessary before the curative
admissibility doctrine applies. The majority rule views the failure to
object as immaterial. 5 The rationales supporting this rule vary. Some
courts have reasoned that a party introducing inadmissible evidence
waives future objections to inadmissible evidence of a similar nature.' 6
Other courts accept the inadmissible evidence based on the "opening
the door" doctrine. 7 Under this doctrine, if one party, without objection,
introduces inadmissible evidence, courts view the door as being opened
to similar inadmissible evidence offered by an opponent."8 A third basis
for the rule is that a party introducing incompetent evidence is estopped
13. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 58; J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 15.
14. See 262 N.W.2d at 390. First, General Motors contended that the admission of
opinion testimony by the investigating officers concerning alcohol consumption and brak-
ing marks entitled it to introduce rebuttal testimony. See id. Second, General Motors
claimed that admission of testimony concerning Busch's driving and sleeping habits enti-
tled it to introduce expert testimony in rebuttal. See id. Because on both occasions the
testimony offered by plaintiff's witness was admissible, the court held the doctrine of
curative admissibility did not apply. See id.
15. See United States v. Regents of New Mexico School of Mines, 185 F.2d 389 (10th
Cir. 1950) (condemnation; majority rule applied to specific offer of purchase); State v.
Mercer, 13 Ariz. App. 1, 473 P.2d 803 (1970) (defendant, having opened door to inadmissi-
ble evidence, may not object when prosecution asks questions of witness on same matter);
Hopwood v. Thomas Hoist Co., 71111. App. 2d 434, 219 N.E.2d 76 (1966) (when plaintiffs
witness testified on direct examination that physician had examined plaintiff for workers'
compensation claim, it was proper for defendant to cross-examine physician on such
testimony); State v. Owens, 301 So. 2d 591, 593 (La. 1974) (defense cannot complain about
inquiries on cross-examination pertaining to subject matter of direct examination); Lucas
v. State, 479 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1972) (testimony regarding polygraph test admitted for
rebuttal purposes); Larson v. Pischell, 13 Wash. App. 576, 535 P.2d 833 (1 975).
16. See, e.g., Larson v. Pischell, 13 Wash. App. 576, 580, 535 P.2d 833, 836 (1975)
("The subject having been raised by the plaintiffs in their case in chief, they cannot now
be heard to claim it was error."); J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 15, at 309.
17. See, e.g., State v. Mercer, 13 Ariz. App. 1, 3, 473 P.2d 803, 805 (1970) (defendant,
having "opened the door" to inadmissible evidence, may not subsequently complain);
Scott v. Wilson, 157 Iowa 31, 33, 137 N.W. 1043, 1044-45 (1912) (when plaintiff introduced
oral evidence bearing on a contract he was not entitled to object to introduction of respon-
sive oral evidence); State v. Barnett, 156 Kan. 746, 747, 137 P.2d 133, 137 (1943) (defend-
ant, by testifying as to his own character, opened door for state to show prior bad
behavior); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 386 (Minn. 1977) (doctrine of
curative admissibility permits introduction of inadmissible evidence when "door is
opened" by introduction of similar evidence on same point).
18. See cases cited in note 17 supra.
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from objecting to the other party's inadmissible evidence. 9 Finally, at
least one court has reasoned that courts should give both parties the
benefit of the same rules of evidence.
20
The minority rule views the failure to object as barring an opponent
from introducing similar inadmissible evidence. 21 Courts following the
minority rule have suggested three rationales. First, parties should not
have the right to introduce immaterial evidence by their failure to object
to inadmissible evidence.2 2 Second, as a matter of public policy, court
time should not be wasted by hearing inadmissible evidence. 2 Finally,
some courts have reasoned that two wrongs never make a right.
24
The third view, known as the Massachusetts rule, is an intermediate
one. 25 Courts following this approach permit the trial court discretion as
to the admissibility of curative evidence.
2
Although a 1975 Minnesota case appeared to place Minnesota in the
19. See, e.g., Peterson v. McManus, 187 Iowa 522, 526, 172 N.W. 460, 465 (1919) (plain-
tiff, having introduced inadmissible evidence, is estopped to deny counterproof); State v.
Owens, 301 So. 2d 591, 593 (La. 1974) ("the defense cannot be heard to complain about
inquiries on cross-examination pertaining to the subject matter of the direct examina-
tion").
20. See Bremhorst v. Phillips Coal Co., 202 Iowa 1251, 1261, 211 N.W. 898, 904 (1927).
21. See, e.g., Henson v. State, 239 Ark. 727, 732, 393 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1965) (rape; "The
evidence offered by appellant was clearly inadmissible, but this did not justify the state
in offering inadmissible evidence."); People v. McDaniel, 59 Cal. App. 2d 672, 677, 140
P.2d 88, 90 (1943) ("Legitimate cross-examination does not extend to matters improperly
admitted on direct examination."); Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Hartridge, 110 Ga. App.
203, 215, 138 S.E.2d 173, 181 (1964) (immaterial evidence does not entitle opponent to
rebuttal evidence); Burnett v. Rutledge, 284 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (in
personal injury action admission of inadmissible evidence does not authorize inadmissible
rebuttal evidence).
22. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Durkin, 185 Ill. 546, 550, 57 N.E. 433, 434-35 (1900).
23. See, e.g., Laursen v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 813, 816, 268
P.2d 104, 106 (1954) ("The so-called 'open the gates' argument is a popular fantasy.");
Baltimore & S.R.R. v. Woodruff, 4 Md. 242, 255 (1853) (introduction of improper evidence
by one party does not justify introduction of similar evidence by another party; any other
rule would lead to confusion and the destruction of the rules of evidence).
24. See, e.g., Henson v. State, 239 Ark. 727, 732, 393 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1965); Stapleton
v. Monroe, 111 Ga. 848, 36 S.E. 428 (1900) (per curiam).
25. See Brown v. Perkins, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 89, 96 (1861); J. WIGMORE, supra note 10,
§ 15, at 307.
26. See, e.g., Herget Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 21 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1027, 316 N.E.2d 191,
193 (1974) ("If one party's evidence opens up an issue and the other party will be preju-
diced unless he can introduce contradictory or explanatory evidence he should be permit-
ted to do so .... "); Vine St. Corp. v. City of Council Bluffs, 220 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Iowa
1974) ("The rule in Iowa is that when one party introduces inadmissible evidence, with
or without objection, the trial court has discretion to allow . . . otherwise inadmissible
evidence on the same subject when it is fairly responsive."); Roy v. Commonwealth, 191
Va. 722, 729, 62 S.E.2d 902, 905 (1951) ("Evidence, though immaterial and admitted
without objection, may be rebutted if necessary to prevent an unfair influence or prejudice
which might otherwise exist.").
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category of jurisdictions following the minority rule,27 the Busch court,
without stating any reasons, held that General Motors' failure to object
to the allegedly inadmissible evidence was immaterial. 8 In so holding,
the court clarified and limited the doctrine's application to those situa-
tions in which the original evidence was inadmissible and prejudicial
and the inadmissible rebuttal evidence is limited to the same eviden-
tiary facts as the original inadmissible evidence.
2 9
So formulated, the curative admissibility doctrine in Minnesota is
simply a corollary of the rule that trials should be fair to all litigants.3 0
Accordingly, after a party introduces inadmissible evidence, the oppos-
ing party should receive a similar favorable ruling on evidence of the
same character relating to the same issue.3 ' Although the Busch court
viewed the doctrine of curative admissibility with favor, its interpreta-
tion of the doctrine failed to benefit General Motors because the court
found that the evidence General Motors intended to rebut was either
admissible, nonprejudicial, or of a different character than that sought
to be brought before the jury.32 Consequently, General Motors was un-
able to persuade the court that a new trial should be granted because
of evidentiary errors made by the trial court.
Second, the Busch court addressed the propriety of both Angeline
Busch's damage awards33 and the propriety of the trial court's order
substantially reducing three of the claimants' damage awards.3 4 General
Motors claimed that Angeline Busch's damage awards were excessive
because, when invested at eight percent, they yielded an amount greater
than her projected annual medical expenses and lost earning capacity, "-
thereby violating the Hallada v. Great Northern Railway36 test of rea-
27. See Williams v. Hoyt Constr. Co., 306 Minn. 59, 71, 237 N.W.2d 339, 347 (1975).
28. 262 N.W.2d at 387.
29. See id.
30. But see Williams v. Hoyt Constr. Co., 306 Minn. 59, 71, 237 N.W.2d 339, 347 (1975)
(curative admissibility doctrine is not a doctrine of "fair play").
31. See 262 N.W.2d at 387.
32. See id. at 390.
33. See id. at 396-400.
34. See id. at 400-01.
35. See id. at 397.
36. 244 Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673 (1955), overruled in part, Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc.,
262 N.W.2d 377, 397 (Minn. 1977). In Hallada, the court stated:
The reasonableness of an award for damages can be appraised only in the light
of the elementary principle that plaintiff should be given neither more nor less
than a sum which leaves him financially whole to the same extent as he would
have been had no injury occurred. Whether an injured person has been made
financially whole must be tested by determining what the total amount of dam-
ages awarded by the jury will accomplish for him if conserved and used with
ordinary prudence. Here we have a verdict of $170,154.81. If this sum is invested
at three percent plaintiff will receive in interest alone an annual income of
$5,104.64 or slightly less than his regular preinjury income of $5,400. If the
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sonableness. In Hallada, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that dam-
age awards are unreasonable when the award plus the respective interest
on the total damage award exceeds a plaintiffs projected annual medi-
cal expenses and lost earning capacity." The Busch court specifically
overruled Hallada because its effect was to require injured plaintiffs to
invest their pain and suffering awards and to use the resulting interest
for future medical expenses and wage loss. 3 Overruling Hallada was
further justifiable because pain and suffering awards are intended to
compensate past as well as future pain and suffering."
Three of the claimants also appealed the trial court's order, which
substantially reduced their damage awards."0 Traditionally, the reduc-
tion of a jury's verdict has been left to the discretion of the trial court
and has been a decision with which the supreme court would not inter-
fere on appeal, absent a clear showing that the trial court had abused
its discretion.' Moreover, before the Minnesota Supreme Court would
reverse a trial court's order reducing a verdict, the preponderance of the
evidence had to be "manifestly and palpably in favor of the verdict."42
The Minnesota court appeared to remove much of the trial court's
discretion in a 1976 decision in which the court suggested that a remitti-
tur was proper only when the evidence clearly indicated jury mistake,
money is invested at the reasonable rate of only three and one-fourth percent
he will have an annual interest income of $5,530.03 or slightly more than his
former income. When his life expectancy expires he will still possess the entire
principal sum of $170,154.81.
Id. at 97, 69 N.W.2d at 686 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
37. See 244 Minn. at 97-99, 69 N.W.2d at 686-87. This reasoning had been accepted
consistently by the Minnesota court. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Cargill, Inc., 281 Minn. 480,
491, 163 N.W.2d 59, 67 (1968); Cox v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 250 Minn. 187, 195, 84
N.W.2d 263, 268-69 (1957); Clay v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 104 Minn. 1, 14, 115 N.W.
949, 955 (1908).
38. See 262 N.W.2d at 397.
39. See AhIstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M.R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 29, 68 N.W.2d
873, 891 (1955).
40. 262 N.W.2d at 400-01. The remittiturs in question were as follows:
Plaintiff Jury Award Remittitur Order
Angeline Busch
Future Expenses $1,000,000 $725,000
Pain and Suffering $800,000 no remittitur
Lando Busch
(found 15% at fault) $608,500 $135,400
Francis Vohnoutka $250,000 $19,192
41. See, e.g., Stenzel v. Bach, 295 Minn. 257, 261, 203 N.W.2d 819, 822 (1973); DeWitt
v. Schuhbauer, 287 Minn. 279, 286, 177 N.W.2d 790, 795 (1970); Pagett v. Northern Elec.
Supply Co., 283 Minn. 228, 238, 167 N.W.2d 58, 65 (1969).
42. See, e.g., Koenig v. Ludowese, 308 Minn. 380, 243 N.W.2d 29 (1976); Rheiner v.
Stillwater St. Ry. & Transfer Co., 29 Minn. 147, 150, 12 N.W. 449, 451 (1882).
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bias, or improper motive." The Busch court, however, appears to have
returned to the prior "abuse of judicial discretion" standard because, in
affirming the trial court's remittitur order, neither the supreme court
nor the trial court indicated that the jury had suffered from passion or
prejudice or had misapplied a mathematical formula in computing any
of the plaintiff's damages, other than those arising from Mrs. Busch's
claim." Consequently, Busch renders uncertain the circumstances in
which a trial court may grant a remittitur.
A third significant issue considered by the Busch court involved the
right of a married woman to bring a cause of action in her own name
for future medical expenses. The court recognized Angeline Busch's
right to bring such an action and affirmed the damages awarded to her
by the trial court." Prior to Busch, a husband was deemed to have the
exclusive right to recover his wife's medical expenses." The only excep-
tions to this rule occurred when a wife either paid or had impliedly
assumed liability for her future medical expenses. 7 Such a result devel-
43. See Koenig v. Ludowese, 308 Minn. 380, 383-84, 243 N.W.2d 29, 31 (1976).
44. See 262 N.W.2d at 400-01.
45. See id. at 401-02.
46. Historically, the Minnesota rule has been that an actionable wrong, resulting in
personal injury to the wife, gives rise to two causes of action against the wrongdoer; one
in favor of the wife for her own personal damages and another in favor of the husband for
loss of the services and society of his wife and for expenses incurred by him for medical
treatment of her injuries. See, e.g., Plain v. Plain, 307 Minn. 399, 403-04, 240 N.W.2d 330,
332-33 (1976), overruled in part, Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d at 402; Janke
v. Janke, 292 Minn. 296, 299-300, 195 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (1972), overruled, Busch v.
Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d at 402; Boland v. Morrill, 275 Minn. 496, 498-99, 148
N.W.2d 143, 145 (1967), overruled in part, Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d at
402. Thus, because a husband was primarily liable for the payment of his wife's medical
expenses, the wife usually was precluded from recovering such expenses herself.
47. Minnesota courts have granted married women the right to recover their own medi-
cal expenses only under unusual or special circumstances. See Paulos v. Koelsch, 195
Minn. 603, 607-08, 263 N.W. 913, 915 (1935) (plaintiff and husband had lived apart for
five years, during which time no support payments were made); Fink v. Baer, 180 Minn.
433, 434-35, 230 N.W. 888, 888-89 (1930) (husband died before trial; wife paid expenses).
Other jurisdictions also have held that a wife may recover her own medical expenses
under varied circumstances. See, e.g., Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 234 Ark. 347, 349, 352
S.W.2d 96, 97-98 (1961) (wife permitted to recover amounts on her own initiative or as a
result of acts of a wrongdoer); Hyland v. Southwell, 320 A.2d 767, 768-69 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974) (same); Hickey v. Shoemaker, 132 Ind. App. 136, 143-44, 167 N.E.2d 487, 490 (1960)
(same); Staskiewicz v. Galvic, 13 Mich. App. 215, 219-21, 163 N.W.2d 815, 817-18 (1968)
(wife contracted for medical services and paid almost all bills); Rearick v. Manzella, 355
S.W.2d 134, 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962) (wife contracted or incurred liability for her medical
treatment); De Fossez v. Lake George Marine Indus., Inc., 281 A.D. 1002, 1002, 120
N.Y.S.2d 449, 450 (1953) (wife incurred bills on her own credit and paid bills with her own
funds); Verchereau v. Jameson, 122 Vt. 189, 195, 167 A.2d 521, 525-26 (1961) (wife permit-
ted to recover medical expenses for which she has assumed primary liability); Baum v.
Bahn Frei Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 237 Wis. 117, 125, 295 N.W. 14, 17 (1940) (wife
permitted to recover for expenses she has previously paid).
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oped out of the "protective" interpretation given women under the Min-
nesota married women's property statute." Because the trial court
granted Angeline Busch's request that she be deemed responsible for her
future medical expenses, the Busch court had to review its prior inter-
pretation of that statute. 9
The rule that a husband is deemed to have the exclusive right to
recover the reasonable cost of care, treatment, and cure of his wife's
personal injuries was justified through the judicial fiction that a hus-
band and wife constituted one legal entity with the husband having the
only right to bring suit either in the name of one or both marriage
partners 0 As a result of this legal fiction, a wife lost all capacity to sue
or be sued without joining her husband as a plaintiff or defendant in the
suit.'
48. MINN. STAT. § 519.05 (1978) provides:
No married woman shall be liable for any debts of her husband, nor shall any
married man be liable for any torts, debts, or contracts of his wife, committed
or entered into either before or during coverture, except for necessaries furnished
to the wife after marriage, where he would be liable at common law. Where
husband and wife are living together, they shall be jointly and severally liable
for all necessary household articles and supplies furnished to and used by the
family.
49. Originally Lando Busch included a claim for past and future medical expenses and
attendant care for Angeline Busch in his complaint. At the commencement of the trial,
counsel for Mrs. Busch moved to amend his client's complaint to allow her to collect future
medical expenses and attendant care, leaving the past medical expenses and attendant
care to her husband's complaint. The motion was predicated on the argument that she
had assumed the obligation of her future medical expenses and future attendant care and
that the rule in Minnesota denying her the right to recover such expenses, as affirmed in
Janke v. Janke, 292 Minn. 296, 195 N.W.2d 185 (1972), overruled, Busch v. Busch Constr.,
Inc., 262 N.W.2d at 402, was outdated in light of the current status of women in society.
Appellants-Respondents Lando Busch and Busch Construction, Inc. argued that the
amendment was merely a tactical move on the part of Mrs. Busch to avoid forfeiture of
recovery in the event that Mr. Busch was found negligent and therefore unable to recover.
See Brief for Appellant at 61.
Prior interpretations of section 519.05 of the Minnesota Statutes had held that the test
of whether a wife could recover her own medical expenses was one of an unequivocal
agreement by the wife directly with the parties supplying the services to the exclusion of
the husband and not one of an alleged agreement between the husband and wife. See
Janke v. Janke, 292 Minn. 296, 299-300, 195 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (1972), overruled, Busch
v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d at 402; Boland v. Morrill, 275 Minn. 496, 501, 148
N.W.2d 143, 147 (1967), overruled in part, Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d at
402.
50. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs ON THE LAwS OF ENGLAND 441-45 (3d ed. Cooley
1884). In fact, the very.legal existence of the wife's personal and property rights was
regarded as suspended for the duration of the marriage, or at least, as incorporated and
consolidated into those of the husband. See id. at 441.
51. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 859-60 (4th ed. 1971). See
generally Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and Wife,
15 MOD. L. REv. 133 (1952); Williams, The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 MoD.
L. REv. 16 (1946).
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Fortunately, toward the middle of the nineteenth century, statutes
known as married women's property statutes, or emancipation statutes,
began to appear in the United States.5 2 These statutes purported to give
married women many of the legal rights that previously had been held
only by men.53 In Busch, an attempt was made to carry the prior inter-
pretations of Minnesota's married women's property statute one step
further by allowing Angeline Busch to recover her own future medical
expenses.5 Similar attempts had already proved successful within the
limits of married women's property statutes in other jurisdictions. 55 Ac-
cepting the argument that a married woman has a right to contract, the
Minnesota Supreme Court replaced its prior construction of the statute
with a more contemporary interpretation that recognizes the right of a
married woman to bring an action for her own future medical expenses
in her name." In permitting Angeline Busch to recover such expenses,
the Busch court overruled several prior Minnesota cases,57 indicating
that its prior decisions did not accurately reflect the trend with which
women were being treated by the law.58 The Busch court further ration-
alized its interpretation of the statute on the premise that any other
52. Married women's statutes are collected in 3 C. VERNIER, AMERCAN FAMILY LAWS §§
167, 179-180 (1935). For a discussion of the development of property rights for married
women, see English, Married Women and Their Property Rights: A Comparative View,
10 CATH. U.L. REV. 75 (1961).
53. See W. PROSSER, supra note 51, § 122, at 861.
54. Previously, the statute had been interpreted to permit a married woman to recover
her own medical expenses only if she had specifically contracted with the parties rendering
the medical services. See, e.g., Janke v. Janke, 292 Minn. 296, 299-300, 195 N.W.2d 185,
186-87 (1972), overruled, Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d at 402; Boland v.
Morrill, 275 Minn. 496, 501, 148 N.W.2d 143, 147 (1967), overruled in part, Busch v. Busch
Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d at 402. In Busch, the Minnesota Supreme Court was confronted
with the question whether a wife should be allowed to recover her future medical expenses
solely on the basis of an agreement between a husband and a wife in which the wife
assumed primary liability for such expenses. See 262 N.W.2d at 401-02.
55. See Graham v. Central of Ga. Ry., 217 Ala. 658, 660, 117 So. 286, 288 (1928) (wife
must sue for personal injuries to self, but husband retains action for compensatory dam-
ages resulting therefrom); Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 470, 45 A.2d 789, 793 (1946)
(damages due to incapacity of wife by reason of personal injury recoverable by her and
not her husband); Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 168 N.E. 169 (1929) (wife has
right to recover future probable medical expenses); Laskowski v. People's Ice Co., 203
Mich. 186, 188-89, 168 N.W. 940, 942 (1918) (husband not necessary or proper party to
wife's suit); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963) (wife given
privilege of suing to protect whatever rights she has, but not to create new causes of
action); Gilman v. Gilman, 115 Vt. 49, 50-51, 51 A.2d 46, 47 (1947) (wife has statutory
right to sue for damages resulting from personal injury).
56. See 262 N.W.2d at 402.
57. See id. (overruling Plain v. Plain, 307 Minn. 399, 240 N.W.2d 330 (1976); Janke v.
Janke, 292 Minn. 296, 195 N.W.2d 185 (1972); Boland v. Morrill, 275 Minn. 496, 148
N.W.2d 143 (1967)).
58. See id.
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construction would be inconsistent with a wife's right to enter into con-
tracts and to incur liabilities. 9
While the Busch court permitted a married woman to bring suit to
recover her future medical expenses, the court did not interpret the
married women's statute as relieving the husband of all liability to pay
for his wife's medical or other necessary expenses. Rather, the court held
that a husband's liability for necessary expenses is secondary while the
wife's liability for such expenses is primary.1
The Busch court's holding, therefore, should not alter substantially a
husband's duty to support his wife. The court, however, appeared reluc-
tant to deprive a husband of all access to a damage award claimed by
his wife. The Busch court's hesitation probably stemmed from the fear
that a wife might collect an award and then fail to pay her expenses
covered by the award.6' Consequently, the Busch court suggested that
any future medical funds be placed in a trust fund.62 In suggesting the
establishment of such a trust, the court also indicated that the recovery
of future medical expenses by an injured wife is an issue in need of
legislative review. 3 If the married women's property statute was re-
pealed rather than modified, however, major problems could occur.
Without this statute, it is doubtful whether alimony or other support
obligations of the husband could ever be successfully enforced.6 ' Any
legislative modifications of the statute, therefore, should be carefully
tailored to balance a husband's liability for his wife's expenditures
against a woman's need to receive alimony. Perhaps the Legislature
should consider the current impact of the statute in light of Minnesota's
59. See id. The right of a woman to contract independently is contained in MINN. STAT.
§ 519.03 (1978), which provides in part: "Every married woman . . . may make any
contract which she could make if unmarried, and shall be bound thereby .... "
60. 262 N.W.2d at 402. The term "necessary" is not capable of exact definition, but it
generally has been asserted that whatever reasonably and naturally aids in the relief of
distress, or materially promotes comfort, of either body or mind, may be deemed a neces-
sary expense. See, e.g., Conant v. Burnham, 133 Mass. 503, 505 (1882). Medical expenses,
including surgical, hospital, dental, and nursing expenses and services, and medical sup-
plies are generally considered to be within the scope of necessaries. See, e.g., Plain v.
Plain, 307 Minn. 399, 403, 240 N.W.2d 330, 332-33 (1976), overruled in part, Busch v.
Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d at 402; Janke v. Janke, 292 Minn. 296, 300, 195 N.W.2d
185, 187 (1972), overruled, Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d at 402; Boland v.
Morrill, 275 Minn. 496, 501-02, 148 N.W.2d 143, 146-47 (1967), overruled in part, Busch
v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d at 402.
61. See 262 N.W.2d at 402.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. According to MINN. STAT. § 609.375 (1978), a husband may be guilty of a misde-
meanor if he knowingly refuses to perform his legal obligation to support his wife. The
repeal of section 519.05 could serve to eliminate any such criminal liability on the part of
the husband. See 62 MINN. L. Rav. 1316, 1321-22 & 1321 n.34 (1978).
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ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment.65 Such considera-
tion should lead to modification of the statute so as to make each spouse
secondarily liable for each other's necessary expenditures.
Perhaps the most significant issue addressed by the Busch court con-
cerned the interplay between the doctrines of products liability6 and
comparative negligence. Jurisdictions adopting both doctrines must
eventually face the troublesome problem of determining the extent to
65. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the United States* Constitution was
ratified by the Minnesota Legislature in 1973. See H.R.J. Res., 68th Minn. Legis., 1973
Sess., 1973 Minn. Laws 2465.
66. The strict products liability theory is set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toars
§ 402A (1965), which states:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or.
consumer, or to his property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
The Restatement's rule first was discussed and approved in Minnesota in McCormack v.
Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338-39, 154 N.W.2d 488, 499-500 (1967). However, actual
application of the products liability doctrine had to wait for subsequent cases. See, e.g.,
Waite v. American Creosote Works, Inc., 295 Minn. 288, 204 N.W.2d 410 (1973) (applying
strict liability doctrine to a situation involving a defective power pole); Farr v. Armstrong
Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 88-94, 179 N.W.2d 64, 68-71 (1970) (applying strict liability
doctrine to a situation involving a defective tire). See generally Note, A Reappraisal of
Contributory Fault in Strict Products Liability Law, 2 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 235 (1976)
(analysis of the general applicability of strict products liability with emphasis on Minne-
sota).
67. Minnesota's comparative negligence law is contained in MINN. STAT. § 604.01
(1978). The adoption of comparative negligence laws over the past decade has been dra-
matic. Prior to 1969, only seven states had adopted some type of comparative negligence
statute. Since that time, 21 additional states have enacted comparative negligence laws.
See Note, Contribution and Indemnity-An Examination of the Upheaval in Minnesota
Tort Loss Allocation Concepts, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 109, 124-25 n.77 (1978) (contain-
ing a comprehensive list of state comparative negligence laws).
The adoption of the strict products liability doctrine has undergone a similar explosion.
See Reitz & Seabolt, Warranties and Products Liability: Who Can Sue and When?, 46
TEmP. L.Q. 527 (1973) (indicating that 34 states permit recovery based on strict products
liability concepts); 1 PROD. LiLA. REP. (CCH) 4050-70 (indicating that 48 states have
accepted strict products liability concepts).
1979]
11
et al.: Evidence—Remedies—Property Rights—Torts—Busch v. Busch Constructi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW RE VIEW
which a plaintiff's conduct should affect any potential recovery." In
addressing this difficult issue, the Busch court approved the trial court's
use of a special verdict that required the jury to compare the motor
vehicle driver's negligence with General Motors' strict liability.60 The
Busch court held that such a comparison was proper because with Min-
nesota's adoption of Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute in
1969,70 the Legislature also acquiesced in the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's pre-1970 interpretation of the borrowed statute.' Consequently,
the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Dippel v. Sciano,72 which
68. For a discussion of this problem, see Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based
on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 267; Keeton, Assumption of Product Risks, 19
Sw. L.J. 61 (1965); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence,
and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972); Wright, Hoelter-Skelter: Product
Defect and Plaintiff Negligence-A Connecticut Commentary on Confusion, 10 CONN. L.
REv. 90 (1977); Note, supra note 66.
69. See 262 N.W.2d at 393-94. Other courts have applied comparative fault principles
in products liability cases. See, e.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 547 F.2d 885 (5th
Cir. 1977) (court apparently also applied a comparative fault approach applicable only
when the plaintiff's fault is failing to discover or guard against the possibility of the
existence of a defect); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975);
Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Micallif v. Miehle
Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976) (although accident occurred
prior to adoption of comparative-negligence statute, court indicated that comparative
negligence and strict liability may be compared); General Motors v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d
344 (Tex. 1977) (comparative causation applied to misuse situation); Dippel v. Sciano,
37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). But see Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th
Cir. 1976) (holding that applying Nebraska slight-gross comparison statute would be
confusing in a strict liability case); Hoelter v. Mohawk, 170 Conn. 495, 365 A.2d 1064
(1976) (dissent chastising majority for not applying comparative fault concepts).
Whether the Busch court actually adopted a comparative fault approach is uncertain,
however, because of its description of the comparative negligence statute as a comparative
cause statute. See 262 N.W.2d at 394. Consequently, future litigation is necessary to
determine whether a jury in determining liability is to compare causation or causal fault.
Apparently, the only commentator who has considered this issue is Jensvold. See Jens-
void, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability
Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723, 741-45 (1974). For a general discussion of causation in tort
law, see Calebresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69 (1975); Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEx. L.
REv. 42 (1962); Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv.
543 (1962); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956); Twerski,
From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability
Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 296 (1977); Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry
Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REv. 403 (1978).
70. The Wisconsin comparative negligence statute was enacted in 1931. See Act of June
15, 1931, ch. 242, § 1, 1931 Wis. Laws 375, as amended by Act of July 26, 1949, ch. 548, §
2, 1949 Wis. Laws 498, as amended by Act of May 20, 1965, ch. 66, § 4, 1965 Wis. Laws
95, as amended by Act of June 22, 1971, ch. 47, 1971 Wis. Laws 50 (current version at
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Cum. Supp. 1978)).
71. See 262 N.W.2d at 393.
72. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
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applied the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute in a strict prod-
ucts liability case,7 3 required the judicial adoption of a comparative fault
approach to products liability claims in Minnesota." In Dippel, the
Wisconsin court held that all types of plaintiff negligence could be com-
pared with a defendant's strict liability because strict liability is equiva-
lent to negligence per se.15
The Busch court, however, departed from the Dippel holding in two
respects. First, the court did not indicate that strict liability is equiva-
lent to negligence per se. 71 Instead, in a rather cursory fashion, the court
merely held that a plaintiff's negligence may be compared with a defen-
dant's strict liability. Second, the Busch court held that there are excep-
tions to the rule that a plaintiff's negligence is to be compared with a
defendant's strict liability." To insure the protection of consumer reli-
ance on a product's safety, the court adopted the position that all negli-
gence except a consumer's negligent failure to inspect or guard against
product defects should be compared with a defendant's strict liability.5
In an attempt to clarify its holding that negligent failure to inspect
or guard against defects is not to be compared with a defendant's strict
liability the court held that all other types of consumer negligence,
misuse, or assumption of risk must be compared with a defendant's
strict liability. 7 Unfortunately, the court's failure to distinguish be-
tween failure to inspect or to guard against product defects and misuse
will present difficulties as practitioners and trial courts attempt to dis-
till the various types of plaintiff misconduct. Consequently, an analysis
of the judicial treatment of plaintiff misconduct is necessary to under-
stand the proper application to be given the defenses available in a strict
liability action."
73. See id. at 461-62, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
74. See 262 N.W.2d at 393-94. The Minnesota court gave as an additional justification
for applying the comparative negligence statute to strict products liability cases that
"shifting some of the risk of loss away from negligent plaintiffs is consistent with the same
policy found in § 402A." Id. at 394.
75. See 37 Wis. 2d at 461-62, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
76. See 262 N.W.2d at 394.
77. See id.
78. See id. The Busch court adopted the position advocated in a recent law review Note.
See Note, supra note 66, at 251. The Busch court's decision to exempt a consumer's
negligent failure to inspect a product or to guard against a product defect from liability
apportionment should be lauded because the National Commission on Product Safety
estimated in 1970 that 20 million Americans are injured in their homes each year in
product accidents, and as many as seven million workers are injured annually in product
accidents on the job. See Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An
Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REv. 425, 425 (1974) (citing President's
Report on Occupational Safety & Health (May 1972)). No doubt, many of these injuries
occurred because of the accident victim's failure to inspect or to guard against a defect.
79. 262 N.W.2d at 394.
80. See notes 81-88 infra and accompanying text.
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The defense of misuse has received various interpretations by the
courts."' Some courts take the position that plaintiff misuse of a product
constitutes an affirmative defense. 2 Courts using the misuse defense in
this fashion require defendants to prove product misuse. 3 Most courts,
however, take the position that misuse relates only to the question of
whether a product is defective and whether the product's defectiveness
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury." Under this approach
a plaintiff must prove that the product was used in a foreseeable man-
ner.1 Assuming that the plaintiffs use of the product was foreseeable,
the defendant is liable for all injuries that an ordinary prudent person
reasonably could foresee.M
The disagreement over the application of the misuse doctrine was not
clarified by the Busch court. Indeed, the Busch court neither defined
misuse nor explained how the misuse doctrine should be applied. Refer-
81. See Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and As-
sumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher,
supra note 78, at 427-34.
Apparently, the first time any court addressed the misuse defense in a strict tort case
was in Justice Traynor's famous concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring), in which reference
is made to "normal and proper use." Id. at 466, 150 P.2d at 444.
The comments to the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Toms § 402A (1965) reflect a quasi-
misuse terminology. For example, comment g refers to the use of a product in a "normal"
manner; comment h states that a product is not defective "when it is safe for normal
handling and consumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling . . . or from
abnormal preparation for use, . . . the seller is not liable." Comment k makes reference
to the product's "intended and ordinary use."
82. Compare Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 639, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679,
682 (1966) (requiring plaintiff to prove that he was injured while using the product in a
way intended) with Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 356, 357-58, 243 N.E.2d
843, 845-46 (1968) ("[In an action pleaded and tried on a theory of strict liability in tort,
contributory negligence is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proved by the defen-
dant.").
83. See, e.g., Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966)
(plaintiff misused defective scaffold wheel); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d
1353 (Okla. 1974) (drinking while driving constituted misuse); Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.
v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (plaintiff barred from recovery because
home permanent lotion was misused).
84. See, e.g., Thompson v. Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281
(1972) (plaintiff's arm amputated by plastic molding machine); Taylor v. Carborundum
Co., 107 Ill. App. 2d 12, 246 N.E.2d 898 (1969) (grinding wheel that shattered was not
misused); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976) (strict liability based
on foreseeability concepts); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)
(dump truck not misused when plaintiff failed to brace truck while doing mechanical
repairs).
85. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[41[d] (1978); Note,
supra note 66, at 245-46.
86. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 85, at § 16A[41[d].
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ence to prior Minnesota cases also fails to clarify these issues. "7 Argua-
bly, the only conclusion that can be drawn from prior Minnesota misuse
cases is that application of the misuse doctrine represents an effort to
utilize the then-prohibited defense of contributory negligence without
using contributory negligence terminology.1
8
Clothing contributory negligence in misuse terminology, however, cre-
ates troublesome problems in light of the conflicting results that may
occur when an injured party's conduct encompasses both failure to in-
spect or guard against product defects, and misuse."8 For example, con-
sider a situation in which a consumer purchases a chair that appears to
have a broken rung. While standing on the chair it collapses causing
serious injuries. Separating the consumer's failure to inspect or guard
against a defect from the arguable misuse of the chair presents obvious
difficulties. As this example indicates, future situations will occur in
which the same plaintiff conduct falls within the parameters of failure
to inspect or guard against product defects or misuse. Consequently,
until the Busch holding is clarified, the area of plaintiff misconduct will
be one fraught with semantical problems."
87. See Olson v. Village of Babbit, 291 Minn. 105, 189 N.W.2d 701 (1971); Magnuson
v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969); Kerr v. Coming Glass Works,
284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969). Kerr was the first Minnesota case dealing with a
misuse defense. In that case, the plaintiff was injured when a baking dish manufactured
by the defendant exploded. See id. at 116, 169 N.W.2d at 587. The court held that the
plaintiff could not recover as a matter of law because she was unable to prove that the
bruise in the dish existed when it left the manufacturer's control. See id. at 117-19, 169
N.W.2d at 588-89. Apparently the Kerr court's misuse test places the burden on the
plaintiff to negate any intervening misuse of the product; otherwise recovery is barred.
See id. at 117-19, 169 N.W.2d at 588-89.
Less than three months after Kerr, the Minnesota court reconsidered its misuse test in
the Magnuson case. In Magnuson, the plaintiff suffered injury when he was thrown from
his snowmobile and struck his knee on a protruding sparkplug. See 285 Minn. at 36, 171
N.W.2d at 204. The evidence showed that the protruding sparkplug was obvious and that
the plaintiff-was aware of its existence. The court indicated that because the defect was
obvious, the plaintiff misused the product. See id. at 41, 171 N.W.2d at 207. Consequently,
the plaintiff was barred from recovering damages. However, because it is not clear from
the Magnuson court's opinion whether contributory negligence, misuse, or assumption of
risk barred recovery it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to the proper application of
the misuse doctrine.
Subsequently, in the Olson case, the court used the misuse doctrine to determine
whether a product was defective. In that case, a child was injured while igniting an
unexploded rocket found after a fireworks show. See 291 Minn. at 106-07, 189 N.W.2d at
703. Because the use that the injured child made of the fireworks was unforeseeable the
court held that the product was not defective. See id. at 110, 189 N.W.2d at 705.
88. See Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REv. 373, 384 (1978) (misuse grew up "as a response to the rule
that ordinary contributory negligence is not a defense to an action for strict liability").
89. See Wright, supra note 68, at 109.
90. See Vargo, The Defenses to Strict Liability in Tort: A New Vocabulary With An
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Two possible solutions exist to solve the problem that is presented
when a plaintiffs negligence falls within the ambit of the failure to
inspect or guard against product defects, or the misuse categories. One
solution is for the court to define misuse as behavior that consists of
something other than a failure to discover or to guard against product
defects. To implement this concept, a jury should be instructed that
failure to inspect or to guard against product defects does not constitute
misuse."' So instructed, a jury would be permitted to find misuse only
if the misuse did not consist of or was in addition to a failure to inspect
or to guard against defects. Such a jury instruction would preserve the
holding in Busch because it permits a jury to find product misuse while
complying with the court's order that failure to inspect or to guard
against product defects does not constitute a defense to a strict liability
claim .92
A second solution to the problem that arises when a plaintiffs con-
duct contributes to an injury would be to recast misuse as part of con-
tributory negligence. Under this approach the jury would receive an
instruction free of any confusing misuse language; the jury should be
instructed that the plaintiff can be found negligent only if such negli-
gence did not consist of failing to inspect or to guard against product
defects." The rationale supporting the merger of misuse and contribu-
tory negligence is threefold. First, recognizing that misuse is a part of
contributory negligence is consistent with the Minnesota court's reason-
ing in Springrose v. Willmore,'4 which merged implied assumption of the
risk with contributory negligence 51 Second, retention of the misuse ter-
Old Meaning, 29 MExcER L. Rzv. 447, 455-60 (1978) (indicating that "a new vocabulary"
has been created by courts when comparing and contrasting various strict liability defen-
ses).
91. 'Misuse could be defined to exclude failure to discover or guard against a defect as
follows:
Product users have a duty not to misuse products. Misuse is the use of a product
in an improper manner. Because the user fails to discover a defective condition
in the product, or fails to guard against defects, does not mean the product was
misused.
92. See 262 N.W.2d at 394.
93. This can be accomplished by a simple modification of 4 MmNNoeA PRAcricE JIG
11, 101 G-S (2d ed. 1974) which states:
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care . .. [RJeasonable care is that
care which a reasonable person would use under like circumstances. Negligence
is the doing of something which a reasonable person would not do, or the failure
to do something which a reasonable person would do, under like circumstances.
Id. When plaintiff misconduct is at issue the following instruction could be given:
Negligence, by the product user, is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable
care is that care which a reasonable person would use under like circumstances,
but does not include failure to discover or guard against product defects.
94. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
95. Id. at 25-26, 192 N.W.2d at 827. The court stated that "[sluch assumption of risk
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minology is inconsistent with prior Minnesota case law, which treated
misuse as an aspect of contributory negligence. 6 Finally, an examina-
tion of the historical roots of the misuse defense in products liability
cases clearly shows that the rationale for the separate defense of misuse
is no longer valid in Minnesota. 7
Although the merger of misuse and contributory negligence may be
inconsistent with the Busch court's enumeration of the various types of
plaintiff misconduct, 8 such a merger is fully consistent with the reason-
ing expressed in prior Minnesota cases." More important, such a
is but a phase of contributory negligence." In so holding, the court stated that the Minne-
sota jury instruction that allowed implied assumption of risk to be a separate defense
should be abandoned. Id. at 26, 192 N.W.2d at 828.
96. See, e.g., Erickson v. Quarstad, 270 Minn. 42, 132 N.W.2d 814 (1964); Miller v.
Macalester College, 262 Minn. 418, 115 N.W.2d 666 (1962); Johnson v. West Fargo Mfg.
Co., 255 Minn. 19, 95 N.W.2d 497 (1959).
In Erickson the plaintiff was injured when he placed his hand on a cable after releasing
a hydraulic hoist to which it was attached. As a result, his hand was drawn into a pulley
and his fingers were partially severed. Arguably the plaintiff misused the hydraulic hoist;
nevertheless, the court held that the injury was attributable solely to plaintiff's conduct,
that he was contributorily negligent, and had assumed the risk as a matter of law. See
270 Minn. at 52, 132 N.W.2d at 821.
The plaintiff in Miller fell from a scaffold while it was being moved across a dirt floor.
The fall resulted from the scaffold's wheels falling into a trench in the floor. The court
referred to testimony given at the trial, which indicated that the scaffold was not to be
moved when a person was on it. See 262 Minn. at 424, 115 N.W.2d at 670. Implicit in the
court's statement is the realization that the plaintiff misused the scaffold. The court
analyzed plaintiffs actions in terms of contributory negligence and held that it was proper
to submit that issue to the jury. See 262 Minn. at 431, 115 N.W.2d at 674.
In Johnson the plaintiff's decedent was killed when the elevator he was changing stop-
hooks in collapsed. The elevator collapsed because the stop-hooks were improperly used
to support the machine while its cables were being changed. Although the decedent
apparently misused the stop-hooks, the court evaluated his conduct in terms of negligence
rather than treating misuse as a separate and independent defense. See 255 Minn. at 24-
25, 95 N.W.2d at 501.
Implicit in the court's failure to analyze the plaintiff's negligence in misuse terminology
in Erickson, Miller, and Johnson is the recognition that treating misuse as a separate and
independent defense only confuses the basic inquiry, which is to determine whether the
plaintiff's own conduct was negligent.
97. See Wade, supra note 88, at 384 (indicating that the misuse defense developed as a
result of contributory negligence not being a defense to a strict liability claim).
98. See 262 N.W.2d at 394.
99. See note 96 supra. Adding to the uncertainty generated by the Busch apportionment
exceptions is the recent passage of a comparative fault statute in Minnesota. See MINN.
STAT. § 604.01 (1978). The statute's broad definition of fault may require that all types of
plaintiff conduct be compared with a defendant's strict liability. Such a result, however,
would frustrate several of the policies behind the imposition of strict liability, which
include protecting consumer reliance that results from mass production and complex
marketing conditions, see Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373,
382 (Iowa 1972); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500
(1967), avoiding interpretive difficulties inherent in warranty law, see Greenman v. Yuba
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merger will serve to overcome the problems resulting in situations in
which a plaintiffs misconduct encompasses both failure to inspect or to
guard against product defects and misuse. '®
The Busch decision clearly portends significant changes in Minnesota
law. Although the court merely clarified existing Minnesota law with
regard to the evidence issue, new law was enunciated in the areas of
damages, married women's property rights and products liability. Re-
garding damages, injured plaintiffs are no longer required to invest their
pain and suffering awards and to use the interest attainable for future
medical expenses and wage loss. The Busch court failed, however, to
clarify the circumstances in which a trial court may grant a remittitur
thereby rendering uncertain the standard of review that will be used to
consider remittitur orders. Although the Busch court recognized that a
married woman has a right to bring suit in her own name to recover
future medical expenses, in effect, a husband's duty to support his wife
was not substantially altered because a husband may still be found
liable for his wife's necessary expenditures. In reaching its decision the
court indicated the entire married women's statute should be reviewed
by the Legislature in light of the changing status of women in society.
The Busch court also indicated that a plaintiffs negligence could be
compared with a defendant's strict liability. To protect consumers of
defective products, the Busch court defined negligence to exclude a
plaintiffs failure to inspect or guard against product defects. Future
litigation will be needed, however, to distill the various types of plaintiff
misconduct.
Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), and simplifying
recovery in products cases. See Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 87, 337
A.2d 893, 898 (1975).
A more sound approach, and one less likely to undermine the Busch court's reasoning,
is to judicially define "fault" or "negligence" to exclude a consumer's negligent failure to
inspect or to guard against product defects.
100. See Vargo, supra note 90, in which the author states:
Furthermore, relabeling contributory negligence as "misuse," then applying this
new label as part of the requisite elements of defect, causation, or foreseeability,
would not only reinject into the case elements that were specifically rejected as
defenses to strict liability, but would also shift the burden of proof from the
defendant to the plaintiff. All this could be accomplished through the use of the
"new vocabulary" which is in reality a mere renaming of the old factual ele-
ments of contributory negligence.
. . . Thus, there is no need to consider misuse an independent bar to recov-
ery. . . . [tihe term "misuse" has little to add to the defect or causation
requirements, and serves only to add confusion to the already difficult issues.
Id. at 458 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 5
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss2/7
